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INTERPRETING    
SECRETARY  PERKINS  
Barry Cushman† 
WOULD LIKE TO THANK Professors Ernst and Davies for inviting 
me to respond to Professor Ernst’s essay. Professor Ernst 
maintains that the Hughes-Roberts visit described by Secretary 
Perkins in her oral history occurred during the summer of 1936, 
while I believe that it took place in 1935. The principal reason for my 
belief is that the summer of 1935 is what Perkins herself expressly 
reported in her oral history as the time of the visit: during the summer 
after the May 1935 decision in United States v. Schechter Poultry Corp., 
but before the January 1936 decision in United States v. Butler, and 
before other events that she places “quite early in ‘36.” As I noted in 
my previous essay, however, Perkins’s reference to a case involving 
“a peculiar child labor matter” that “came up from one of the states” 
in the autumn of 1935 introduced an ambiguity into the manuscript, 
as the Court did not hear any child labor cases during either the 
1935 or the 1936 Terms. Professor Ernst and I agree that the identi-
fication of what he calls the “phantom” child labor case is critical to 
the effort to determine the timing of the visit Perkins described.  
Professor Ernst believes that the case in question was in fact a 
conflation of two cases that did not concern child labor: West Coast 
Hotel v. Parrish, which upheld a state minimum wage statute for 
women, and Helvering v. Davis, which sustained the old-age pension 
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provisions of the Social Security Act.1 As Professor Ernst notes, I 
doubt that Perkins’s reference was to West Coast Hotel. First, such a 
hypothesis requires that the Secretary of Labor, who had been an 
avid social reformer in a generation for whom Adkins v. Children’s 
Hospital had been a bête noir, and to whom the 1936 decision in 
Morehead v. Tipaldo2 was an affront, recalled a major landmark in con-
stitutional law and a long hoped-for milestone in social reform as an 
obscure case about some “peculiar child labor matter” that she hadn’t 
even realized was coming before the Court. Second, the hypothesis 
requires that she remembered a decision that was handed down after 
Tipaldo, after the 1936 election, on the heels of the largest sit-down 
strikes,3 and while the Court-packing plan was still pending, as com-
ing to the Court during a more tranquil period preceding each of 
these events. Such a temporal placement would be all the more 
strange in view of the fact that Perkins correctly recalled the timing 
of U.S. v. Butler, the decision striking down the Agricultural Adjust-
ment Act,4 a matter that was by contrast outside her policy portfolio; 
that she had been busy helping to work up a federal wage and hour 
bill since shortly after the Schechter decision;5 that she had testified in 
favor of that bill a little over two months after West Coast Hotel was 
decided;6 and that two days after West Coast Hotel was decided, she 
called for a conference of legal advisors and labor officials to counsel 
the states on how best to seize the opportunities it presented.7  
                                                                                                 
1 300 U.S. 379 (1937); 301 U.S. 619 (1937). 
2 261 U.S. 525 (1923); 298 U.S. 587 (1936). 
3 See, e.g., SIDNEY FINE, SIT-DOWN: THE GENERAL MOTORS STRIKE OF 1936-37 
(1969), at 303-12; J. WOODFORD HOWARD, MR. JUSTICE MURPHY 151-52 (1968). 
4 297 U.S. 1 (1936). 
5 The Reminiscences of Frances Perkins, 7:71, 76-83, Columbia University Oral 
History Collection, Columbia University, New York, NY (hereafter “Perkins 
Oral History”); FRANCES PERKINS, THE ROOSEVELT I KNEW 254-55 (1946). 
6 See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1937: Joint Hearings on S. 2475 and H.R. 7200 
before the S. Comm. on Educ. and Labor and the H. Comm. on Labor, pt. 1, 75th 
Cong. 173-211 (1937) (hereafter “Joint Hearings”) (statement of Frances Perkins, 
Sec’y of the Dept. of Labor). 
7 “Miss Perkins Calls Parley on State Minimum Pay Laws,” CHRISTIAN SCIENCE 
Interpreting  Secretary  Perkins  
AUTUMN 2014   15  
Professor Ernst canvasses some of the difficulties involved in fit-
ting Helvering v. Davis to Perkins’s description of the phantom child 
labor case, but it also runs into many of the troubles attending the 
West Coast Hotel hypothesis. Perkins had been intimately involved in 
devising the Social Security Act,8 and as Professor Ernst recognizes, 
she most certainly was aware that Davis was before the Court. Davis 
was decided after both West Coast Hotel and the Labor Board Cases, and 
yet Professor Ernst’s account requires not only that she mistakenly 
conflated it with the former and placed it before the latter, but also 
that she located it prior to all of the highly salient events preceding 
West Coast Hotel. It does not seem likely that Secretary Perkins could 
have gotten all of these matters in her own wheelhouse so badly 
wrong. But if by the 1950s her memory had become so unreliable 
that she made all of the errors that Professor Ernst’s account requires, 
then one has to wonder about the reliability of any other uncorrobo-
rated claims that Perkins made in her oral history interview. 
I do not believe that Secretary Perkins was that confused. In-
stead, I believe that the phantom child labor case was actually a case 
about convict labor. In Whitfield v. Ohio,9 handed down on March 2, 
1936, the Court unanimously upheld Ohio’s statute prohibiting sale 
on the open market of convict-made goods. More importantly, the 
Court also upheld the federal Hawes-Cooper Act, which divested 
convict-made goods of their interstate character upon their arrival in 
the destination state, thereby allowing that state’s law to apply to 
the goods free from the restraints of the dormant Commerce 
Clause. The case came to the Court on a petition for certiorari from 
the Ohio Supreme Court, so unlike Davis, it did come up “from one 
of the states.”10 Moreover, the Court granted cert. on October 14, 
1935,11 so unlike West Coast Hotel, it “went up to them that autumn” 
                                                                                                 
MONITOR, Apr. 1, 1937, p. 6; “New National Labor Laws Pondered: Fresh Efforts 
Are Underway at Washington to Deal With the Problems of Minimum Wages 
and Child Labor,” NEW YORK TIMES, Apr. 4, 1937, p. 70. 
8 PERKINS at 278-301. 
9 297 U.S. 431 (1936). 
10 Perkins Oral History, 7:74. 
11 296 U.S. 561 (1935). 
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of 1935.12 It was not decided by a vote of 5-4 or 6-3, but as Profes-
sor Ernst notes, neither was Davis; and in any event, the vote in the 
case strikes one as among the less important of its details, and one 
quite likely to escape recollection nearly two decades later. 
This hypothesis requires further explanation. First, why would 
Secretary Perkins have confused a case about convict labor with one 
about child labor? Throughout this period, the issues of prison labor 
reform and child labor reform were understood to be closely relat-
ed. For nearly three decades before passing the Keating-Owen Child 
Labor Act in 1916, Congress had considered dozens of bills that 
would have regulated the interstate shipment of convict-made 
goods. Some of these measures would have prohibited such inter-
state shipment altogether;13 others, like the Hawes-Cooper Act, 
would have divested the goods of their interstate character upon 
arrival in a destination state.14 Discussions of the constitutionality of 
these measures and the state statutes that they would have allowed 
to apply to interstate goods turned on precisely the sorts of consid-
erations that would inform the Court’s decision invalidating the 
Keating-Owen Act in the 1918 case of Hammer v. Dagenhart: wheth-
er the sale and shipment of goods that were in themselves “harmless” 
could be so restricted,15 and whether the competition that such low-
                                                                                                 
12 Perkins Oral History, 7:74. 
13 See, e.g., H.R. 8716 (50-1), 19 Cong. Rec. 2262 (1888); H.R. 7755 (63-1), 50 
Cong. Rec. 3794 (1913). 
14 See, e.g., H.R. 10617 (52-2), 24 Cong. Rec. 2367 (1893); H.R. 1933 (63-1), 51 
Cong. Rec. 92 (1914). 
15 See, e.g., Interstate Commerce in Goods Manufactured by Convict Labor: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on Education and Labor on S. 4060, 64th Cong. (1916) 
(hereafter “1916 Senate Hearing”) at 51 (Statement of Herbert E. Miles, President 
of the Wisconsin State Board of Industrial Education); id. at 128 (Statement of F. 
Emory Lyon); Interstate Commerce in Convict-Made Goods: Hearings Before the 
S. Comm. on Interstate Commerce on S. 2321, 63d Cong. (1914) (hereafter “1914 
Hearing”), at 249-50, 253-54 (Statement of Edward Boyle, Treasurer, National 
Conference of Charities and Corrections); id. at 137 (Statement of W.H. Hartford); 
Interstate Commerce in Convict-Made Goods: Hearing Before a Subcomm. of the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 62nd Cong., 2d Sess., on H.R. 5601, S. Doc. 63-446 
(1912) at 49-50 (Statement of Edward Boyle); H.R. 4040, H.R. 4064, H.R. 4883, 
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cost goods posed for comparable goods manufactured by free labor-
ers could supply adequate justification for such regulation.16 Several 
participants in the debates explicitly raised the close analogy to child 
labor regulation, and recognized that the constitutionality of such 
congressional bills regulating convict-made goods would entail the 
constitutionality of similar measures regulating child-made goods.17 
It was similarly recognized that a decision invalidating a child-made 
goods statute would cast a shadow over comparable regulations of 
convict-made goods, and after the Court invalidated the Keating-
Owen Act in 1918, the previously steady flow of convict-made 
goods bills dried up. Between 1918 and 1925, inclusive, only one 
such bill was introduced in either house of Congress.18 At the hear-
ing before the House Labor Committee, that bill was condemned as 
unconstitutional in light of Hammer,19 and was never reported out of 
                                                                                                 
Competition of Penal Labor: Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 4 of the H. Comm. on 
Labor, 60th Cong. (1908) (hereafter “1908 Hearing”) at 52, 55-57 (Statement of 
Edward Boyle); id. at 110 (Brief submitted by Edward Boyle); Report of the Indus-
trial Commission on Labor Legislation, H.Doc. 476, Part 3 (56-1) (1900), at 16; In 
re Opinion of the Justices, 98 N.E. 334, 335-36 (Mass. 1912); People v. Hawkins, 
51 N.E. 257, 258-59 (N.Y. 1898); People v. Hawkins, 47 N.Y. Supp. 56, 57-61 
(1897); H. Rept. 2022, Part 2 (50-1), “Views of the Minority,” p. 2. 
16 1914 Hearing at 250 (Statement of Edward Boyle); Report of the Industrial Com-
mission on Labor Legislation, H.Doc. 476, Part 3 (56-1) (1900), at 15-16; People 
v. Hawkins, 51 N.E. 257, 258, 261-62 (N.Y. 1898); H. Rept. 2022 (50-1) at 5. 
17 H.R. 12000, 12001, 21322, Competition of Penal Labor: Hearings Before Sub-
comm. No. 4 of the H. Comm. on Labor (1910) (hereafter “1910 Hearing”) at 
138 (Brief submitted by Leventritt, Cook & Nathan); 1908 Hearing at 110, 115, 
170-71 (Brief submitted by Edward Boyle); id. at 144 (Statement of Edward 
Boyle). See also 41 Cong. Rec. 176 (1907) (Mr. Grosvenor envisioning a convict-
labor bill as a precedent for a child labor bill); 1916 Senate Hearing at 51 (Her-
bert Miles opining that both the convict-labor bill and the Keating-Owen bill 
were unconstitutional); 1910 Hearing at 8 (Helen Boswell of the General Federa-
tion of Women’s Clubs recognizing that the Beveridge Child Labor Bill prohibit-
ing interstate shipment of child-made goods “was not constitutional,” but distin-
guishing the convict-labor bill as merely a divesting measure); ibid. (Mrs. Ellen J. 
Foster, Chairman of the Committee on Child Labor of the National Society of the 
Daughters of the American Revolution, concurring with Ms. Boswell). 
18 H.R. 10241 (67-2), 62 Cong. Rec. 2090 (1922). 
19 Hearings Before the Committee on Labor of the House of Representatives, Sixty-
Barry  Cushman  
18   18  GREEN  BAG  2D  
committee. When the House Labor Committee again held hearings 
on a divesting bill in 1926, the legal opinion requested of the De-
partment of Labor responded that the power of Congress to regu-
late the interstate movement of such “harmless” goods was doubtful 
in view of Hammer,20 and the bill again died aborning. When the 
Senate Commerce Committee held hearings on the Hawes-Cooper 
Act in early 1928,21 Donald Richberg submitted a brief in which he 
argued that the divesting measure passed muster notwithstanding 
Hammer because it did not totally prohibit interstate shipment of the 
goods as the Keating-Owen Act had.22 Proponents of the bill fol-
lowed Richberg’s lead in the floor debates.23 Opponents of the bill, 
by contrast, maintained that Hammer’s condemnation of congres-
sional interference with the interstate transportation of “harmless” 
goods in an attempt to alleviate alleged unfair competition made 
plain the measure’s invalidity.24 
                                                                                                 
Seventh Congress, Second Session, on H.R. 10241 (1922) at 11 (remarks of Mr. 
Black of Texas). 
20 Hearings Before the Committee on Labor, House of Representatives, Sixty-Ninth 
Congress, First Session, on H.R. 8653 (1926), at 343 (opinion of Ethelbert Shaw, 
Commissioner of Labor Statistics). See also id. at 208-09 (legal opinion of James 
S. Lakin, President of the West Virginia State Board of Control, appearing over 
the signature of state attorney general Howard B. Lee). 
21 Hearings Before the Committee on Interstate Commerce of the United States 
Senate on S. 1940 (70-1) (1928). 
22 70 Cong. Rec. 666-67 (1928). 
23 See, e.g., 69 Cong. Rec. 8654 (Mr. Kopp); id. at 8664 (Mr. Sumners of Texas); 
id. at 8749-50 (Mr. LaGuardia); 70 Cong. Rec. at 860 (Sen. Wagner). See also 
Alphonse A. Laporte & Frederick D. Leuschner, Extending State Jurisdiction by Act 
of Congress, 15 A.B.A. J. 199, 200 (1929). 
24 See, e.g., 69 Cong. Rec. 8074-76 (Sen. Blease); id. at 8638-39 (Mr. Ramseyer); id. 
at 8662-63 (Mr. Montague); 70 Cong. Rec. 813 (Sen. Smith); id. at 853-63 (Sen. 
Goff); id. at 864-65, 867 (Sen. Borah); id. at 871, 875 (Sen. Reed of Missouri). 
See also 1928 House Hearing at 247-56 (Statement of Edward D. Robbins, Repre-
senting the State of Connecticut); id. at 257-66 (Statement of Oscar L. Heltzen, 
First Assistant to the Attorney General of the State of Rhode Island); Charles Hall 
Davis, The Hawes-Cooper Act Unconstitutional, 23 LAW. & BANKER & CENT. L.J. 296, 
321-22 (1930); Arthur H. Schwartz, Legal Aspects of Convict Labor, 25 COLUM. L. 
REV. 814, 816 n.19 (1925) (opining on a predecessor divesting bill). 
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When cases litigating the constitutionality of the Hawes-Cooper 
Act began to materialize in 1934, its opponents routinely invoked 
Hammer in support of their claims,25 while supporters relied upon 
the distinction raised by Richberg.26 Richberg had candidly main-
tained that a divesting bill for child-made goods would likewise be 
constitutional,27 and when the Court unanimously upheld the Act 
without so much as mentioning Hammer, commentators immediately 
recognized the ramifications for child labor reform.28 Washington 
Democratic Senator Lewis Schwellenbach introduced and defended 
a divesting bill for child-made goods in the waning days of the legis-
lative session, too late for any action to be taken on it;29 but when 
the members of a new Congress convened in January of 1937, they 
arrived prepared to introduce a bevy of child labor bills with provi-
sions modeled on the Hawes-Cooper Act.30 Indeed, Perkins herself 
                                                                                                 
25 See, e.g., Brief for the Complainant, Alabama v. Arizona, 291 U.S. 286 (1934), at 3, 
26-39; State v. Whitfield, 257 N.W. 601, 602 (Wisc. 1934); Record, Whitfield v. 
Ohio, at 24-26; Brief for the Petitioner, Whitfield v. Ohio, 26-27, 47-51. See also 
Lawrence G. Knecht, Notes on Ohio Cases – Power of Congress to Deprive Interstate 
Business of the Benefit of the Original Package Doctrine, 4 Ohio Opinions 366, 368. 
26 Brief for the Respondent, Whitfield v. Ohio, at 34-35, 38. 
27 Hearings Before the Committee on Labor of the House of Representatives on 
H.R. 7729 (70-1) (1928) (hereinafter “1928 House Hearing”) at 65. See also Pro-
ceedings of the 60th Annual Congress of the American Prison Association 138 
(1930) (Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons J.V. Bennett opining 
that if the Hawes-Cooper Act were constitutional there could be no objection to a 
comparable statute concerning child-made goods). 
28 See, e.g., Hugh Evander Willis, Constitution Making in 1935-36, 22 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 206, 214 (1936); Interstate Commerce – Power of Congress – Validity of Hawes-
Cooper Act and State Statute Prohibiting Sale of Convict-Made Goods, 49 HARV. L. REV. 
1007, 1008 (1936); Marvin M. Finder, Constitutional Law – Divesting Prison-Made 
Goods of Their Interstate Character – Original Package Doctrine, 27 AM. INST. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 283, 284-85 (1936); Note, The Power of Congress to Subject Inter-
state Commerce to State Regulation, 3 U. CHI. L. REV. 636, 639-40 (1936). Willis 
and another commentator went so far as to suggest that Whitfield had implicitly 
overruled Hammer. See Willis, supra, at 214; J.A.C. Grant, State Power to Prohibit 
Interstate Commerce, 26 CAL. L. REV. 34, 67-68 (1937). 
29 S. 4736 (74-2), 80 Cong. Rec. 8626-30 (1936). 
30 See, e.g., S. 10 (75-1), 81 Cong. Rec. 65 (1937); S. 26 (75-1), 81 Cong. Rec. 65 
(1937); S. 592 (75-1), 81 Cong. Rec. 149 (1937); S. 668 (75-1), 81 Cong. Rec. 
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explained in her oral history that in 1936 – before either West Coast 
Hotel or Davis had been decided – she attempted to persuade Roose-
velt to introduce her Department’s draft of a bill that could “be de-
fended on the grounds that were canvassed in this child labor 
case,”31 and that Administration lawyers “thought it was a pretty 
good draft, that we had taken advantage of this child labor deci-
sion.”32 Such a divesting provision was included in the Fair Labor 
Standards Act (FLSA) as it was introduced in Congress,33 in the ver-
sion of the bill that passed the Senate in the summer of 1937,34 and 
in the Wheeler-Johnson child labor bill that was passed inde-
pendently by the Senate when the FLSA bogged down in the 
House.35 In the spring of 1938, UCLA political scientist J.A.C. 
Grant wrote that “the ‘divesting’ theory, originated to handle the 
problem of interstate commerce in intoxicants, has proved its prac-
ticability as a basis for labor legislation as well. Quaere, will child 
labor be the next field to feel its sting?”36  
But if Whitfield was viewed as such an important decision at the 
time, why would Perkins have remembered it so imperfectly? 
Though West Coast Hotel and Davis remain decisional landmarks that 
are taught in Constitutional Law classes to this day, the significance 
of Whitfield was quickly eclipsed by events. The divesting provision 
of the Senate version of the Fair Labor Standards Act was stripped 
out by the House, and was not included in the measure that ulti-
mately secured congressional approval.37 The Act’s blanket prohibi-
tion on interstate shipment of goods made under substandard labor 
                                                                                                 
176 (1937); H.R. 4651 (75-1), 81 Cong. Rec. 1179 (1937); H.R. 5377 (75-1), 81 
Cong. Rec. 1939 (1937); S. 1976 (75-1), 81 Cong. Rec. 2670 (1937); S. 2226 (75-
1), 81 Cong. Rec. 3615 (1937); H.R. 6608 (75-1), 81 Cong. Rec. 3772 (1937).  
31 Perkins Oral History, 7:80. 
32 Id. at 7:81. 
33 See Joint Hearings at 62 (testimony of Robert H. Jackson). 
34 81 Cong. Rec. 7949-51, 7957 (1937). 
35 81 Cong. Rec. 9318-20 (1937). 
36 J.A.C. Grant, Interstate Traffic in Convict-Made Goods, 28 AM. INST. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 854, 857 (1938). 
37 52 Stat. 1060 (1938). 
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conditions was unanimously sustained in United States v. Darby Lumber 
Co.,38 rendering the divesting alternative no longer attractive or rel-
evant. By 1940 Congress had enacted a comparable statute flatly 
prohibiting the interstate transportation of convict-made goods, 
making the divesting approach otiose even within that domain.39 
And though Whitfield was much-discussed in the law review litera-
ture of the 1930s, by the time that Perkins gave her interview it had 
virtually fallen out of legal discourse. For example, a Westlaw 
search discloses only two law review articles citing the decision be-
tween 1941 and 1957.40 What once had seemed to be the key to 
successful child labor reform was quickly reduced to a curious relic 
of a bygone era. One can readily understand how Secretary Perkins 
could have forgotten the name of and the vote in Whitfield, and yet 
at the same time appreciate her recollection of its relation to one of 
the contemporary issues that was foremost in her mind: child labor. 
If, as I believe, the phantom child labor case is properly identi-
fied as Whitfield v. Ohio, then that previously worrisome portion of 
the transcript coheres with other portions placing the Hughes-
Roberts visit in the summer of 1935. With that ambiguity resolved, 
the question then becomes whether the evidence adduced by Profes-
sor Ernst suffices to dislodge the visit from this placement in 1935 
and to relocate it to the summer of 1936. I am not persuaded that it 
does. Let us examine each of the pieces of evidence offered. The 
interview with Roberts’s daughter Elizabeth Hamilton corroborat-
ing the occurrence of at least one Hughes visit to the Roberts’s farm 
Kimberton confirms a matter that I do not take to be in dispute, and 
as Professor Ernst observes, it does not help to place the visit in 
time. The June 4, 1936 letter from Mrs. Roberts to Perkins placing 
the Roberts’s at their yearly summer retreat similarly confirms a 
matter that is not disputed, and it too does not assist in pinpointing 
                                                                                                 
38 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
39 54 Stat. 1134 (1940). 
40 Samuel Mermin, “Cooperative Federalism” Again: State and Municipal Legislation 
Penalizing Violation of Existing and Future Federal Requirements: I, 57 YALE L.J. 1 
(1947); Robert L. Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 1933-
1946, 59 HARV. L. REV. 645 (1946). 
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the year of the visit to which Perkins refers in her interview. The 
Washington Post story placing the Hugheses at the Skytop Club in the 
Pennsylvania Poconos during June of 1936 may appear at first blush 
to offer helpful circumstantial evidence of a visit to Kimberton that 
summer. The Hugheses also stayed at Skytop during June of 1935,41 
however, which limits the value of the 1936 report in fixing the 
timing of the visit. And the Wyzanski letter reporting the Secre-
tary’s visit to the Roberts home on May 24, 1937 by no means pre-
cludes other such visits in which Perkins may have discussed recent 
decisions with the Justice. Such visits would not seem at all unlikely 
in view of the close relationship between Perkins and Mrs. Roberts; 
and in light of the perceived contemporary significance of Whitfield 
for child labor reform, it does not appear implausible that that deci-
sion might have provided such an occasion. Professor Ernst does not 
suggest that Perkins apprised Wyzanski of all such visits, nor that 
Wyzanski reported all such visits in his correspondence. The ground 
for making any such assumption is not readily apparent, and there-
fore one must question whether there is reason to conclude that this 
particular visit, the timing of which does not cohere with the other 
temporal landmarks in the interview, was the one to which Perkins 
refers in the transcript. 
As Professor Ernst indicates, the most probative piece of evidence 
tending to place the visit in 1936 is a letter that Wyzanski wrote to 
his mother in April of 1937 reporting on a conversation with Perkins 
in which she stated that “Hughes had been to visit Roberts in Pa. last 
summer . . . .” For two reasons I am not persuaded that this letter 
shifts the preponderance of the evidence. First, there is the question 
of the reliability of the report. The communicative structure of the 
evidence in the letter is presumably Mrs. Roberts (A) to Secretary 
Perkins (B) to Wyzanski (C), who then related the account con-
tained in the letter to his mother. This kind of serial transmission of 
information, more colloquially known as “telephone,” is well known 
                                                                                                 
41 Justice Hughes Spending Week in Poconos, WASH. POST, June 16, 1935, p. S7 (“Chief 
Justice Charles Evans Hughes and Mrs. Hughes arrived at the Skytop Club in the 
Pocono Mountains of Pennsylvania”). 
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for its vulnerability to misunderstanding, distortion, invention, exag-
geration, and elaboration.42 Indeed, this vulnerability provides one 
of the principal reasons for the exclusion of hearsay from judicial 
proceedings.43 
To illustrate the problem, consider another contemporary report 
with the same communicative structure. In October of 1936, 
Wyzanski wrote to his mother to report on a conversation that he 
had had with Thomas Harris, who was Justice Stone’s clerk during 
the 1935 Term. Wyzanski wrote that Harris had told him that “the 
Chief Justice at conference voted with the 3 liberals in the SEC case 
(Jones v. SEC), the case involving excess valuation of railroads (Great 
Northern), and the case involving the commodities clause of the 
Hepburn Act (Elgin, Joliet, R. v. U.S.), but when he found he was in 
the minority, he shied away from a 5-4 decision which would accen-
tuate popular doubts about the infallibility of the Sup. Ct.”44 Yet the 
                                                                                                 
42 The loci classici in the social psychology literature are GORDON W. ALLPORT & LEO 
POSTMAN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RUMOR (1947), and G.W. Allport & L. Postman, 
The Basic Psychology of Rumor, 8 TRANSACTIONS OF THE NEW YORK ACADEMY OF  
SCIENCES (Series II) 61 (1945). See also NICHOLAS DIFONZO & PRASHANT BORDIA, 
RUMOR PSYCHOLOGY: SOCIAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL APPROACHES 135-37, 143, 145 
(2007); DAVID L. MILLER, INTRODUCTION TO COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR 84-87, 92, 96 
(1985); LEWIS M. KILLIAN, COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR 41-42 (2d ed. 1972); TAMOTSU 
SHIBUTAMI, IMPROVISED NEWS: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF RUMOR 3-6 (1966); F.C. 
BARTLETT, REMEMBERING: A STUDY IN EXPERIMENTAL AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 118-
76 (1932); Anthony Lyons & Yoshihisa Kashima, The Reproduction of Culture: Communi-
cation Processes Tend to Maintain Cultural Stereotypes, 19 SOCIAL COGNITION 372 (2001); 
Molly Treadway & Michael McCloskey, Cite Unseen: Distortions of the Allport and 
Postman Rumor Study in the Eyewitness Testimony Literature, 11 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 
19, 22-24 (1987); H. Taylor Buckner, A Theory of Rumor Transmission, 29 PUB. OP. 
Q. 54, 58, 63 (1965); T.M. Higham, The Experimental Study of the Transmission of 
Rumour, 42 BRIT. J. PSYCH. 42 (1951); Gordon W. Allport & Leo Postman, An Analysis 
of Rumor, 10 PUB. OP. Q. 501, 504-05 (1947); Clifford Kirkpatrick, A Tentative 
Study in Experimental Social Psychology, 38 AM. J. SOC. 194 (1932). 
43 See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE 721-23 
(4th ed. 2009). 
44 Charles Wyzanski to Maude J. Wyzanski, Oct. 18, 1936, Box 22, Charles 
Wyzanski MSS, Massachusetts Historical Society, quoted in DANIEL R. ERNST, 
TOCQUEVILLE’S NIGHTMARE: THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE EMERGES IN AMERICA, 
1900-1940 (2014), pp. 182-83 n.76. 
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surviving docket book records of the conferences in these cases do 
not corroborate this account. They do show that Hughes changed 
his vote in Great Northern Railway v. Weeks.45 Both Stone and Brandeis 
record that the conference vote was 5-4, with Hughes joining 
Brandeis, Stone, and Cardozo in dissent. By the time the decision 
was rendered, however, Hughes had abandoned them and joined the 
majority.46 But the docket books do not bear out this account of 
U.S. v. Elgin, Joliet, & Eastern Railway Co.47 Stone and Brandeis each 
record the conference vote as identical to the final vote: 6-3, with 
Justices Brandeis, Stone, and Cardozo dissenting.48 Moreover, the 
docket books do not support Wyzanski’s report of the conference in 
Jones v. SEC.49 Both Stone and Brandeis record a conference vote of 
6-2, with Chief Justice Hughes in the majority. Indeed, the only 
movement between the conference and the final decision was that of 
Justice Brandeis, who had passed at conference but ultimately joined 
Stone and Cardozo in dissent.50 
                                                                                                 
45 297 U.S. 135 (1936) (holding that North Dakota’s valuation of the railroad for 
purposes of taxation was too high). 
46 Stone OT 1935 Docket Book; Brandeis OT 1935 Docket Book. 
47 298 U.S. 492 (1936) (holding that the fact that all of the shares of a railroad 
corporation and all of the shares of a manufacturing corporation were owned by a 
holding company did not render transportation of the manufacturer’s products by 
the railroad a violation of the commodities clause of the Interstate Commerce Act). 
48 Stone OT 1935 Docket Book; Brandeis OT 1935 Docket Book. The case was 
argued April 8 and 9. Stone provides no date for the conference vote, but Brandeis 
records it as April 27. Brandeis entered a note indicating some action on the case – 
though no record of a vote – on April 11. Unfortunately, the note is obscured by 
a pasted-over, typed account of the ultimate disposition – an unfortunate and 
regrettably common practice in the Brandeis chambers. What can be made out of 
the note reads, “Passed [obscured by paste-over] of C.J. [obscured by paste-over].” 
The Brandeis docket book contains no record of any other cases being discussed at 
an April 11 conference, so this action may not have occurred at a conference. 
49 298 U.S. 1 (1936) (upholding the registration statement provisions of the Securities 
Act of 1933, but strongly disapproving the agency’s refusal to permit withdrawal of 
a registration statement allegedly containing material misrepresentations, and quash-
ing its subpoena of the withdrawing registrant’s testimony and business records). 
50 Stone OT 1935 Docket Book; Brandeis OT 1935 Docket Book. Professor Ernst had 
not been granted access to these docket books at the time that his book went to 
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The communicative structure of the evidence in this letter is ap-
parently the same as that of the letter on which Professor Ernst re-
lies here: presumably Justice Stone (A) to Harris (B) to Wyzanski 
(C), who then related the account contained in the letter to his 
mother. We don’t know where along this chain of communication 
the mistakes were made, but the Stone and Brandeis docket books 
cast exceedingly grave doubt over the reliability of the report that 
Wyzanski delivered to his mother concerning Hughes’s voting be-
havior. We cannot discount the possibility that Wyzanski’s report 
concerning the detail of the timing of a Hughes visit to Kimberton 
may also prove to be unreliable gossip, particularly when there does 
not appear to be any other evidence to corroborate that report, and 
when that report would appear to be impeached by Perkins’s own 
account. 
There is a second reason to doubt the contention that the 
Wyzanski letter shifts the preponderance of the evidence. As men-
tioned above, the Hugheses traveled to Skytop during the summers 
of both 1935 and 1936. There is nothing in the evidence presented 
by Professor Ernst that would preclude there having been more than 
one Hughes visit to Kimberton. Thus, even if Wyzanski’s report of a 
1936 visit were correct, that would not exclude the possibility that 
the visit described by Secretary Perkins in her oral history took 
place during the summer of 1935. 
As Professor Ernst remarks, further evidence may yet be discov-
ered. I am happy, as I am sure he is, to follow the evidence wherever 
it may lead. For now, however, it seems to me that the preponder-
ance of the evidence locates the visit to which Perkins referred in 
her interview precisely where she herself placed it: in the summer 
of 1935. 
 
                                                                                                 
press, see legalhistoryblog.blogspot.com/2014/04/the-supreme-courts-docket-
books.html, and therefore he is not to be faulted for not consulting them. 
